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 Concern surrounding foreign misinformation campaigns grew following the Russian 
election interference in the 2016 Presidential election. The spread of false information has a 
number of measurable harms, and in the space of election, makes it impossible for citizens to 
make an informed decision. As reports of similar misinformation spreading ahead of the 2020 
election, and with an ever-increasing share of the American public interacting with false 
information online, the need for policy solutions has grown. Multiple proposed policies have 
circulated, from requiring online advertisements to state where funding has originated from to 
repealing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. This memorandum examines one of 
those policies, the Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act (DETER Act). 
The DETER Act utilizes economic sanctions directed at Russian individuals and institutions that 
participate in election interference operations. The DETER Act is analyzed for its effectiveness, 
its costs, and its political saliency. The Act is determined to meet the requirements of effective 
sanctions, its benefits outweigh its costs, and the political will to move the DETER Act through 
congress is there if the bill can make it out of committee.  
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TO:   Senator Ben Sasse 
 
FROM:  Matthew A. Ellis 
 
DATE:   September 2, 2020 
 
Subject:  Combating Fake News: Minimizing the Effect of Foreign Misinformation 
 
I. Action Forcing Event 
On September 2, 2020, NBC News reported that the Department of Homeland Security 
withheld a bulletin from being distributed to law enforcement agencies due to concerns over its 
evidence standards.1 Written a few weeks before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
received their final report on foreign interference during the 2016 presidential election2, the 
notice warned that foreign agents might promulgate falsehoods about presidential candidate 
Joe Biden leading up to the 2020 presidential election.3  
II. Statement of the Problem 
Misinformation, while not a new phenomena, has become a pressing 21st century 
problem. Both the CATO institute4 and the Brookings Institute5 state that the harms to society 
by false news are real. One of the main reasons the manipulation of information is detrimental 
to society is that it creates imperfect information in a citizenry. From Thomas Jefferson6 to 
Barack Obama,7 many have stated the need for a well-informed public in order for democratic 
society to function. This section will explain why misinformation is a problem that needs to be 
faced. A few prime examples of foreign misinformation adequately showcase that false news, 
                                                        
1 Ken Dilanian, “DHS delayed intel report on foreign powers trying to raise doubts about Biden, Trump health.” NBC 
News, September 2, 2020.  
2 Dustin Volz and Warren P. Strobel, “ Senate Panel’s Russia Probe Found Counterintelligence Risks in Trump’s 2016 
Campaign,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2020.  
3 Josh Margolin, Lucian Bruggeman, Will Steakin, and Jonathan Karl, “DHS withheld July intelligence bulletin calling 
out Russian attack on Biden’s mental health,” ABC News, September 2, 2020. 
4 Matthew Feeney, “Combating COVID-19 Misinformation with Disassociation,” Cato Institute, April 1, 2020.  
5 Robyn Caplan, “COVID-19 misinformation is a crisis of content mediation,” Brookings Institute: Tech Stream, May 7, 
2020.  
6 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Richard Price, January 8, 1789 
7 Mike Murphy, “Read the complete text of Obama’s speech at the Democratic National Convention,” MarketWatch, 
August 19, 2020. 
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propagated by a foreign country, creates a real harm for the United States. The first case is 
Russia’s use of information manipulation during the annexation of Crimea and its subsequent 
use in sowing discord in Texas during the Jade Helm military training exercise. The 2016 
presidential election saw the culmination of these efforts in an information warfare campaign 
meant to influence the outcome of that election. The harms caused by foreign misinformation 
surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic provide an example of the dangers of domestic 
misinformation. Interspersed in these cases are reasons why misinformation is more of a 
problem now than it has been in the past.  
First, disinformation and misinformation must be defined. Disinformation as defined by 
the European Commission is “verifiably false or misleading information that is created, 
presented, and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may 
cause public harm.”8 Disinformation is explicitly intended to create a detrimental effect in the 
communication networks it works its way through. Misinformation, referred to as a “mind-
virus” by some sources,9 is sometimes used synonymously with disinformation though its use 
has been more widespread and as such its definition has varied substantially. Misinformation 
has been defined as false information spread by individuals believing the information to be 
true10, or false information knowingly or unknowingly spread,11 and that which is not necessarily 
meant to cause harm.12 It is evident from these varying definitions that there is some overlap in 
the two concepts. Calder Walton of the Harvard Kennedy School states that, “misinformation is 
false information that a government officially and openly disseminates, whereas disinformation 
                                                        
8 Jason Pielemeier, “Disentangling Disinformation: What Makes Regulating Disinformation So Difficult?” Utah Law 
Review, 2020. 
9 Amanda B. Cronkhite, Wenshuo Zhang, and Leslie Caughell, “#FakeNew in #NatSec: Handling Misinformation,” 
Parameters: U.S. Army War College,” Spring 2020. 
10 Ibid 
11 Ghazal Aghagoli, Emily J. Siff, Anastatia C. Tillman, and Edward R. Feller, “COVID-19: Misinformation Can Kill,” 
Rhode Island Medical Journal, June 2020.  
12 Christina Nemr and William Gangware, “Weapons of Mass Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in 
the Digital Age,” Park Advisors, 2019.  
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is false information that is covertly disseminated.”13 The term “fake news” is often referred to 
interchangeably with both disinformation and misinformation in some literature, but is has been 
defined separately as “news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead 
readers.”14 Propaganda has also been linked to disinformation and misinformation. Etienne 
Brown, quoting Randal Marlin, defines propaganda as, “the organized attempt, through 
communication, to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that 
circumvent an individual’s adequately information, rational, reflective judgment.”15 These 
definitions all seem to describe the same phenomena with minor differences; however, the 
problem discussed herein will primarily be misinformation, spread by a foreign entity, with the 
understanding that it contains some aspects of disinformation, fake news, and propaganda.  
Misinformation became a subject of global scrutiny in 2016 after the Russia’s concerted 
efforts to influence the United States presidential election. Prior to this however, Russia 
deployed a comprehensive disinformation campaign during its annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
Russia Today, now known simply as RT, Russia’s first 24-hour news channel, promulgated 
conspiracy theories and promoted anti-EU positions, melding fact and fiction, influencing the 
sentiments of Russians, and also European citizens.16 In a report by the Institute of Russia, a 
New York based think tank, authors Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss quote the Lithuanian 
Foreign Minster who stated, “Russia Today’s [RT] propaganda machine is no less destructive 
than military marching in Crimea.”17 In one widely cited example, a fake twitter account spread 
conspiracies of Ukraine being involved in the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. RT 
                                                        
13 Calder Walton, “Spies, Election Meddling, and Disinformation: Past and Present,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 
Fall/Winter 2019.  
14 Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Spring 2017.  
15 Etienne Brown, “Propaganda, Misinformaton, and the Epistemic Value of Democracy,” Critical Review: A Journal of 
Politics and Society, February 15, 2019.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, 
Culture and Money,” Institute of Modern Russia, The Interpreter, 2014 
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picked up the story and continued to spread the allegations even after they had been 
disproved.18 Geoffrey Cain of The New Republic wrote that Russia’s disinformation warfare in 
Ukraine was a “testing ground” for further operations.19 Russia took what it learned from its 
Crimean information warfare and applied it to United States.  
In 2015, Russian social media activity helped sow distrust against the United States 
Federal Government in Texas. A routine military training exercise known as Jade Helm 15 was 
planned across multiple states, one of which was Texas. Concerned citizens began circulating 
and paying attention to conspiracy theories that hypothesized that the training exercise was 
setting the stage for implementing martial law, and lead by then President Barack Obama.20 
These conspiracy theories were picked up by media personality Alex Jones, and eventually Texas 
Governor Greg Abbott placed the Texas National Guard on alert, directing them to monitor the 
military exercise.21 Former Director of the National Security Agency and the CIA, Michael 
Hayden, stated that, “Russian bots, Russian trolls, combining with the American alt-right media, 
convinced a nontrivial portion of the Texas population, that it was an attempt by the Obama 
administration to round up political opponents.”22 Hayden went on to assert that the Russians 
viewed their interference in Texas, and the widespread distrust in Government that they sowed, 
as a success, and then turned their eye to election Interference.23  
In the article “Social Media Fake News in the 2016 Election,” authors Hunt Allcott and 
Matthew Gentzkow discuss how misinformation was widely shared on Facebook during the 
2016 presidential election. In a database that the two scholars compiled on misinformation 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 
19 Geoffrey Cain, “Ukraine’s War on Russian Disinformation is a Lesson for America,” The New Republic, March 29, 
2019.  
20 Dan Lamonthe, “Remember Jade Helm 15, the controversial military exercise? It’s over,” The Washington Post, 
September 14, 2015.  
21 Amy Davidson Sorkin, “Unclear Dangers,” The New Yorker, May 10, 2015.  
22 After Truth: Disinformation and the Cost of Fake News, Directed by Andrew Rossi, HBO Documentary Film, Abstract 
Production, 2020. 
23 Jacqueline Thomsen, “Ex-CIA chief says Russian bots fueled Jade Helm conspiracy theories,” The Hill, May 3, 2018. 
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during the election, they found that fake stories were shared a total of 37.6 million times, which 
corresponds to some 760 million instances of a user interacting with the false information.24 
They also document that Social Media platforms are the largest driver of visitors to sites that 
spread misinformation.25 Many sources document that the Internet Research Agency (IRA), 
which ramped up its operations during the Crimea annexation, wages a sophisticated 
disinformation campaign against U.S. voters. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence came 
to the same conclusion and added that Russia’s election interfering “was part of a broader, 
sophisticated, and ongoing information warfare campaign designed to sow discord in American 
Politics and Society.”26  
In Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President, author Kathleen 
Hall Jamieson Director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania 
documented the extent to which the Russian election meddling effected the outcome of the 
election. Jamieson argued that Russian agents who undertook a misinformation campaign were 
indeed successful in influencing the outcome of the election. She traced the way Russian 
hacking and the release of DNC emails that followed, shifted media’s coverage, and that Russian 
information manipulation spread conspiracy theories that shifted it in to a negative slant toward 
Democratic candidate Hilary Clinton.27  That the vast majority of information manipulation took 
place on the Internet points to the novelty of modern misinformation.  
                                                        
24 Hunt Alcott and Matthew Gentzkow, “Social Media Fake News in the 2016 Election,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2017. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 
2016 U.S. Election,” Vol 2., 2020.  
27 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President,” Oxford University 
Press, 2018.  
6 
 
In 2019, nearly three-fourths of United States adults actively get their news on social 
media platforms to some degree; while over 90 percent acquire some their news from the 
Internet.28  
Figure 1. Internet usage for acquiring news among adults.  
 
 
Source: Data sourced from Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 45, 2019; created using Plotly.  
We can see from the graphs in Figure 1 that the share of adults who do not find some or all of 
their news from either social media websites or the Internet is far smaller than those that do. 
The Internet’s propensity to open lines of communications across distances also opened up U.S. 
                                                        
28 “American Trends Panel Wave 45”, Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C., 2019.  
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citizens to foreign influence. One of the defining features of United States foreign relations has 
been its relative security over its history; The U.S. has had very few enemy nations in close 
proximity to its citizens.29 John P. Carlin, former Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security, wrote in his book Dawn of the Code War that the openness of the Internet gave 
extremists and terrorists a way to reach into our homes and talk directly with our children and 
us.30 It seems that never before have we been so open to an enemy. Carlin wrote that, 
“Protecting our digital lives is no longer just about ensuring we don’t lose our family pictures—
it’s about protecting our values, our health, our culture, and our democracy.”31 This would 
include protecting our elections. There are concerns that artificial intelligence technologies will 
exacerbate this problem by increasing the ease of selected message targeting.32 
 John P. Carlin also documented that Russia was not the only foreign entity that was 
capable and willing to employ misinformation tactics. Carlin wrote that in 2013 a Syrian group 
known as the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), known for cyber terrorism and misinformation 
campaigns to promote Basar Al Assad, had hacked into the Associated Press’ twitter feed and 
sent out a message to upwards of two million followers that two explosions had occurred at the 
White House and then President Barack Obama had been injured.33 The disseminating of this 
fake information over Twitter caused a very real drop in the stock market, erasing billions of 
dollars in the span of a minute.34 While the stock market rebounded quickly, it took until 2015 
for members of the SEA to be indicted and extradited to the US. 35 
                                                        
29 Andrew Preston, “American Foreign Relations: A Very Short Introductions,” Oxford University Press, May 1, 2019.  
30 John P. Carlin, “Dawn of the Code War,” PublicAffairs, October 2018.  
31 ibid 
32 Alina Polyakova, “Weapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare,” Brookings Institute, November 
15, 2018. 





A recent article by Joshua Yaffa in the New Yorker argued that domestic misinformation 
is a more pernicious problem than foreign information manipulation. Yaffa wrote that, “when it 
comes to COVID-19, the apparent result of the combined disinformation campaign of Trump and 
Fox News has been devastating.”36 The World Health Organization announced that the while the 
world was facing the global pandemic, it was also facing an “infodemic.”37 Online conspiracies 
purporting that 5G cellphone towers were responsible for spreading COVID-19 caused very real 
property damage in the United Kingdom.38 At least one death during the pandemic resulted 
from a false belief that Chloroquine might help treat the virus,39 and there have been reports 
that 30 calls about ingesting harmful substances were made to the New York City poison 
control, more than double the calls the department receives in any given year, after President 
Trump made comments that bleach may help treat COVID-19.40 Molly Montgomery, a 
nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institute and former U.S. Foreign Service officer, wrote that, 
“In April 2020 alone, Facebook applied warning labels to more than 50 million pieces of content 
that contained misinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic.”41 However, domestic 
misinformation may be exacerbated by foreign entities spreading false information. The 
Associated Press reported that U.S. officials identified a clear link between sites that were 
spreading misinformation about the COVID-19 and Russian Intelligence agents.42 Montgomery 
explains that false information is a wicked problem, that it is a problem that is, “highly complex, 
                                                        
36 Joshua Yaffa, “Believe It or Not,” The New Yorker, September 14, 2020.  
37 “Novel Coronavirus(2019-nCoV: Situation Report – 13,” World Health Organization, February 2, 2020.  
38 Adam Satariano and Davey Alba, “Burning Cell Towers, Out of Baseless Fear They Spread the Virus,” New York 
Times, April 11, 2020.  
39 Theresa Waldrop, Dave Alsup, and Elliot C. McLaughlin, “Fearing Coronavirus, Arizona Man Dies After Taking a Form 
of Chloroquine Used to Treat Aquariums,” CNN, March 25, 2020.  
40 Nicholas Reimann, “Some Americans Are Tragically Still Drinking Bleach As A Coronavirus ‘Cure,’” Forbes, August 24, 
2020 
41 Molly Montgomery, “Disinformation as a Wicked Problem: Why We Need Co-Regulatory Frameworks,” Brookings 
Institute, August 2020.  
42 Eric Tucker, “U.S. officials: Russia behind spread of virus disinformation,” The Associated Press, July 28, 2020. 
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interdependent, and unstable – and can only be mitigated, managed, or minimized, not 
solved.”43  
III. Historical Context  
In early January 2017, just days before Donald Trump was to take office, the news 
website BuzzFeed published a series of memos, known as the Steele Dossier, which contained 
unconfirmed allegations surrounding the President-elect and Russia.44 Soon afterword the 
President-elect tweeted, “FAKE NEWS – A TOTAL POLITICAL WITCH HUNT.”45  While this brought 
modern misinformation to new heights of notoriety, there have been many past Presidents who 
have complained of false information being propagated. George Washington complained of 
newspaper editors “stuffing their papers with scurrility and nonsensical declamation.”46 
Woodrow Wilson railed against the press when they published false stories about his daughters’ 
social life.47 Ronald Reagan complained about “new speak,” what he called falsehoods, in the 
press as governor of California.48 Misinformation is not a new political phenomenon.  
The evolution of misinformation follows closely that of the evolution of media in the 
United States. Misinformation has often waxed and waned, though it recently has risen again to 
new heights. This is due in part to the changing structure of how the American people acquire 
their news. The media ecosystem is often how misinformation achieves its wide spread, more so 
now that that ecosystem has extended to the Internet. This means that misinformation and the 
way the people get their news are intrinsically linked. This section will delve into the history of 
this problem as well as give an explanation as to how media and misinformation are related. It 
will also document in more detail the threat foreign misinformation played in the 2016 
                                                        
43 Montgomery, “Disinformation as a Wicked,” 2020 
44 Scott Shane, Adam Goldman, and Matthew Rosenberg, “Trump Received Unsubstantiated Report That Russia Had 
Damaging Information About Him,” New York Times, Jan 10, 2017.  
45 Ibid 
46 Harold Holzer, “The Presidents vs. The Press,” Dutton Press, 2020, page 4.  
47 Ibid, page 131.  
48 Dave McNary, “Reagan sees 1984 “newspeak” in DB,” Daily Bruin, 1972. 
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presidential election and beyond. This section will also provide the background of various 
policies and tools have been proposed to try and ameliorate foreign misinformation in the past, 
along with comparisons of how other countries and regions are dealing with the problem 
currently. 
Misinformation has its historical roots in the practice known as “yellow journalism.” 
Craig Carey of the University of Southern Mississippi argued that yellow journalism, exaggerated 
news, spread quickly in the late 19th century due to increases in telegraph usage49 and others 
have argued that this type of reporting may have helped push the United States in to war with 
Spain in 1898.50 However, increased attention to sensational reporting lead to increased 
criticism and calls for oversight.51 After corporate fears of increased regulation by the 
government rose during the 1940s, ethical codes began to be adopted by newspaper 
associations in the early 20th century in an attempt to lessen the call for reform.52 Criticism over 
the commercialized nature of the press led more publishers to realize that they would benefit 
from separating the reporting from the “commercial imperatives if they wished to retain 
legitimacy, stave off government intervention, and continue to reap commercial rewards.”53 
Victor Pickard wrote in Democracy without Journalism that this change became a method of 
“soft self-regulation.”54 Yochai Benkler et al wrote in Network Propaganda: Manipulation, 
Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics, that this professionalization led to a 
sense of generally accepted notions about reality in the press and thus in the population.55 This 
professionalism and the barriers between the commercial and publishing side of newspapers 
                                                        
49 Craig Carey, “Breaking the news: Telegraphy and Yellow Journalism in the Spanish-American War,” American 
Periodicals, 2016.  
50 Herold Holzer, “The Presidents Vs The Press,” 2020. 
51 Victor Pickard, “Democracy without Journalism.” page 22. 
52 Alfred G. Hill, “The Practice of the Kansas Code of Ethics for Newspapers,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 1922.  
53 Victor Pickard, “Democracy without Journalism.” page 31.  
54 Ibid  
55 Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts, Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization 
in American Politics, Oxford University Press, 2018. 
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seems to have reduced the amount of yellow journalism and misinformation in the later half of 
the 20th century. 
The newspaper industry, and its generally accepted notions, were imperiled however by 
the rise of the Internet and changes in media ownership. In 2005 Ken Auletta wrote in The New 
Yorker that, “there is something almost prehistoric about using expensive newsprint and 
elaborate delivery systems, to homes and newsstands, in the age of the Internet.”56 
Newspapers, especially local papers, declined significantly in the early 21st century. The Pew 
Research Center found that in 2000, classified ad revenue for newspapers had reached a high of 
approximately $19.6 million and by 2008 had fallen to nearly half that amount.57 Pew also 
reported that overall newspaper ad revenue declined by $23.4 billion from 2005 to 2010, down 
from a high of $49.4 billion.58 This steep decline in newspaper revenue was followed by a 
decline in journalists as newspapers tried to cut costs.59  
This decline in the newspaper industry also coincided with a growing consolidation of 
news corporations. Pickard wrote that even new online media companies such as Vox, 
BuzzFeed, the Huffington Post, and Vice were still owned, in part or wholly, by the larger media 
companies like AOL and Disney.60 Pickard quoted David Simon, a former Baltimore Sun reporter, 
who stated that this new type of online media, owned by the old media, “leaches [its] reporting 
from mainstream news publications, whereupon aggregating websites and bloggers contribute 
little more than repetition, commentary, and froth.”61 Pickard wrote that in this media 
ecosystem, commercialization incentivize the media companies, newspapers, television stations, 
                                                        
56 Ken Auletta, “Fault Line: Can The Los Angeles Times Survive Its Owners?” The New Yorker, October 3, 2005.  
57 Sydney Jones, “Online Classifieds,” Pew Research Center, May 22, 2009 
58 “Newspapers Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, July 9, 2019 
59 Victor Pickard, “Democracy without Journalism.” page 31. 
60 Victor Pickard, “Democracy without Journalism.” Page 44. 
61 Victor Pickard, “Democracy without Journalism.” Page 41. 
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and online platforms, to churn out stories that garner attention and are cheap to produce.62 He 
wrote that, “pundits and panels of experts can simply discuss the President’s latest tweets” and 
that, “this kind of superficial coverage is irresistible for profit-driven commercial news media but 
detrimental to democratic discourse.”63  
One policy response to this aspect of misinformation, a lack of reliable news, has often 
been to suggest a public media option. In 2009, when the newspaper crises was in full focus due 
to the extreme job losses coming about from the Great Recession, the U.S. Senate Commerce 
Committee held a hearing about that to do about the future of journalism.64 John Kerry argued 
that since the government oversaw the, “licensing of broadcasts,” and the “regulatory oversight 
of cable, satellite, and other issues with respect to communication,” that the government did 
have the means and authority to protect and regulate the newspaper industry.65 However, there 
has been some scholarship that shows that the United States is an outlier when it comes to 
lacking a robust public media. Citizens in Britain and some European countries enjoy a better-
funded public media system,66 and in return their populace is generally more informed.67 Figure 
2 shows the various per capita amounts that the various democracies spend on public media. It 
can be seen that the United States is outspent by all countries represented. The only 
comparable country is New Zealand, which per capita outspends the U.S. seven times over on 
public media. Benson, Powers, and Neff write that the U.S. public media broadcasting system 
relies in large part on wealthy donors, and because of this often skews content.68  
           
 
                                                        
62 Ibid 
63 Victor Pickard, “Democracy without Journalism.” Page 3. 
64 Victor Pickard, “Democracy without Journalism”, page 40. 
65 ibid 
66 Victor Pickard, “A Social Democratic Vision of Media: Toward a Radical Pre-History of Public Broadcasting,” Journal 
of Radio and Audio Media, 2017.  
67 Rodney Benson, Matthew Powers, and Timothy Neff, “Public Media Autonomy and Accountability: Best and Worst 
Policy Practices in 12 Leading Democracies,” International Journal of Communication, 2017. 
68 Benson et al, “Public Media Autonomy,” 2017 
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         Figure 2  
 
Source: Data sourced from Rodney Benson, Matthew Powers, and Timothy Neff, “Public Media Autonomy and Accountability:  
Best and Worst Policy Practices in 12 Leading Democracies,” International Journal of Communication, 2017; created using 
ggplot2.  
One of the prime examples that Benson et al detail is a series created and aired by PBS against 
public pensions, funded by a wealthy donor who was lobbying to have public pension systems 
dismantled.69 They write that the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 created Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting (CPB), which has the broad objective of “facilitating programs of ‘high quality, 
diversity, creativity, excellence, and innovation,’” though they note that the CPB has little means 
at their disposal to fulfill this goal.70 As a dearth of local reporting emerged, an abundance of 
online social media grew. 
 The FCC attempted to address the issue of changing news structures with their report, 
“Information Needs of Communities.” The report, released in 2011, notes that despite the 
abundance of new media technologies, the U.S. was experiencing a “media deficit.”71 They note 
that while more news is being produced, they found that the news produced, “offered less in-
depth coverage of critical topics,” and that many news sources were not, “investing in more 
                                                        
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid 
71 Steven Waldman, “The Information Needs of Communities,” FCC, 2011.  
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reporting on critical local issues.”72 In the report, the FCC also noted what regulations it has used 
in the past to regulate broadcasting. The FCC required in 1940 that broadcasting stations, “must 
agree not to editorialize,”73 This eventually led to the adoption of the Fairness Doctrine which 
required that broadcasters, “provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues of 
interest in the community,” and that they, “afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation 
of contrasting viewpoints.” While the Supreme Court ruled that the Fairness Doctrine was 
constitutional in 1969, it was abolished in the 1980s.74 Laura K. Smith of the St. Edwards 
University wrote in “Consolidation and News Content: How Broadcast Ownership Policy Impacts 
Local Television News and the Public Interest,” that the FCC has used two approaches in its 
regulatory history. The FCC, “has restricted certain kinds of content that it deems harmful or 
inappropriate” and “required certain kinds of content in hopes of service the civic needs.”75 The 
FCC reported on the new media brought on by the Internet, mentioning that users were already 
spending far more time on sites like Facebook than they had on newspapers.76 And yet, it is a 
testament to the newness of the recent resurgence of false information, that misinformation 
was only mentioned twice in the FCC report, neither reference mentioning social media 
platforms, but only in passing as a minor problem that some entities were trying to solve.77  
 Modern misinformation seems to have crept into the modern era slowly. During the 
2004 Presidential campaign, candidate John Kerry accused President George W. Bush of waging 
a campaign of “mass deception.”78 While some point to this as the first moment of modern 
misinformation, it’s full start began in earnest in 2008 with the emergence of the “birther” 
                                                        
72 Ibid.  
73 Steven Waldman, “The Information Needs of Communities,” FCC, 2011. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Laura K. Smith, “Consolidation and News Content: How BroadCast Ownership Policy Impacts Local Television News 
and the Public Interests,” Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, 2009 
76 Steven Waldman, “The Information Needs,” 2011. 
77 Ibid 
78 Mark Follman, “Weapon of mass deception,” Salon.com, October 9, 2004. 
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movement, which alleged that the Presidential Candidate Barack Obama was not born in the 
United States. The “birther” faction started as a outcropping of the Tea Party Movement,79 and 
it was not until 2011 when President Obama released his full birth certificate that the majority 
of Republicans began distancing themselves from the “birther” movement.80 Even after the 
certificate was released, there were some that clung to the conspiracy, even as the 2016 began 
election began.81  
The birther conspiracy was only a hint of what was to come. With the Jade Helm 15 
misinformation influence deemed a success, the Russian’s undertook a full-fledged campaign to 
influence the 2016 Presidential Election. This ushered in waves of misinformation throughout 
the election season. Both foreign and domestic instances of misinformation were rampant. One 
oft cited example is a conspiracy known as “pizzagate.” The incident involved an Internet 
conspiracy theory, propagated by sites that some believe are Russian “sock puppets,” such as 
YourNewsWire.com,82 and right leaning media sites such as InfoWars, which republished and 
spread misinformation directly from Russian media sources.83 The conspiracy alleged that Hillary 
Clinton and other influential leaders of the Democratic Party had engaged in child-sex-trafficking 
through an often-frequented pizza place in Washington D.C. known as Comet Pizza.84 Benkler et 
al trace the misinformation surrounding the “pizzagate” conspiracy to multiple Russian linked 
sources, though they note that Russians were not the only progenitors of the conspiracy. The 
full conspiracy brewed together online. Benkler et al, along with Kathleen Hall Jamieson, noted 
that the tangential conspiracy theories could never have culminated in the “pizzagate” 
conspiracy, and the subsequent shooting in the restaurant by an individual who believed them, 
                                                        
79 Benjamin R. Warner and Ryan Neville-Shepard, “Echoes of a Conspiracy: Birthers, Truthers, and the Cultivation of 
Extremism,” Communications Quarterly, March 2014 
80 Ibid 
81 Amy Davidson Sorkin, “Trump is Still Lying About Birtherism,” The New Yorker, September 20, 2016.  
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had the Russians not hacked the DNC and released private emails through WikiLeaks.85 As 
mentioned above, Jamieson argued that the hacking of the DNC, and the subsequent 
information manipulation had an effect on swing voters in key states.86 
 After the election, many in the United States, and around the world, proposed and 
implemented measures meant to prevent another successful information manipulation attempt. 
The United Kingdom, led by then Prime Minster Theresa May, stated that the National Security 
Communications Team would be expanded to include in their mission the task of deterring state 
actors and foreign adversaries from spreading disinformation.87 Similar task forces were 
implemented in Australia, Canada, and Denmark.88 Right-wing media websites such as the 
Drudge Report and The Washington Times reported on the  
 Many other countries have decided that misinformation is indeed a problem that 
requires a policy response. Germany---. Some countries in Africa such as Uganda and Kenya 
have implemented a tax on social media sites in an attempt to curb “gossip.”89  
In 2018, the European Union (EU) brought together experts on the topic of 
misinformation to create a plan to combat the spread of false news. Some of the solutions 
proposed in the first meeting were, “increasing transparency of financial interests, collaborating 
more with research, fostering media literacy, extending news rating services, reducing spam, or 
additional regulation.”90 Transparency of financial interests manifested through requiring 
transparency of political advertisements. Australia, Canada, France, and Germany all 
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implemented some form of political ad finance reporting for political content online.91 In the fall 
of 2017, the Honest Ads Act was introduced in the Senate, which would require and expansion 
of disclosure requirements for Internet advertisement.92  
A number of countries have required social media companies such as Facebook and 
Twitter to more heavily regulate speech on their platforms. The EU created a framework for 
cooperation, with agreements between governments and platforms detailing the flagging and 
removing of posts.93 Ruth Levush, a foreign law specialist with the Library of Congress noted 
that Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Mozilla all signed a EU Code of Practice on Disinformation.94  
In the United States it seems that the “soft self-regulation” form of regulating speech on these 
social media platforms has continued for now. There has been some discussion however among 
lawmakers on the removal or reform of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which 
protects social media platforms from being held responsible for the content posted on their 
sites by users.95 Senator Josh Hawley [R-MO] introduced the Ending Support for Internet 
Censorship Act in 201996 while Senators Roger Wicker [R-MS], Lindsey Graham [R-SC], and 
Marsha Blackburn [R-TN] introduced the Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act in 2020, 
both aimed at altering Section 230.97  
Sanctions have also been proposed as a means to deter foreign election interference. 
Denmark passed a 2019 law criminalizing the act of spreading disinformation meant to benefit a 
foreign entity, while severe penalties are levied in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates for 
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spreading misinformation that is proven to be against the countries interests.98 In the United 
States, two laws have been proposed involving sanctions. In a confusing turn, both were called 
DETER. The first is the Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act, which aims 
to implement economic sanctions against Russian agents spreading misinformation to influence 
elections.99 The second, titled Defending Elections against Trolls from Enemy Regimes Act, which 
aims singularly to prevent foreign agents who participate in election interference from entering 
the United States.100 The latter DETER Act passed the Senate, while the former has been 
introduced twice, though it has not made it out of committee.   
IV. Policy Proposal  
The policy proposed herein is the Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing 
Redlines Act (DETER). As mentioned above, DETER was originally introduced in the Senate in 
2018, and then again in 2019. The goal of this policy simply put is to, “deter foreign interference 
in United States elections.”101 The DETER Act attempts to dissuade foreign governments, 
specifically the Russian Federation, from attempting to interfere in a United States election by 
imposing financial burdens on those foreign governments and their institutions that choose to 
interfere in U.S. elections. A more quantifiable goal of DETER would be to see the number of 
reports made by the Department of National Intelligence (DNI) that identify an attempt by a 
foreign government to influence an election, decrease as the deterrence goes into effect. 
Furthermore, if the deterrence is successful, the number of incidences in which sanctions are 
issued in response to interference should be lower than if the deterrence is unsuccessful.102  
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Title I of the DETER Act sets a deadline of 60 days after an election, for the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI), consulting with the Directors of the National Security Agency, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretaries of 
State, Treasury, and Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, to submit a report to 
congress and the president detailing, “with a high level of confidence whether or not the 
government of a foreign country, or any foreign person acting as an agent of or on behalf of that 
government, knowingly engaged in interference in the election.”103 This report can be 
supplemented with additional intelligence if new findings require that the original report needs 
to be updated. If the report does indeed determine that there was foreign election interference, 
and if that interference was carried out by the Russian Government, or on their behalf of the 
Russian Government, then the report must include a list of all senior political figures and other 
high ranking Russian individuals. Title I also amends the Countering America’s Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act by adding a new subsection that states that the Secretary of the Treasury 
will submit within a year of the passage of DETER, a report on the finances of the various 
Russian Federation officials.104  
 Title II of the DETER Act first requires that the President submit a report twice a year to 
the proper congressional committees on the finances of Russian oligarchs and high-ranking 
Russian Federation individuals. The second section of Title II requires that, in the case of the DNI 
report finding that the Russian Federation or any agent acting on the behalf of the Russian 
Federation did in fact interfere in an election in the U.S., the president will then impose financial 
sanctions on the perpetrators. These include: (1) blocking assets of Russian institutions such as 
Russian Banks, Russian Energy companies, Russian Defense and Intelligence sectors, and other 
Russian, State-owned entities;  (2) Prohibit all transactions inside the United States made by 





individuals in debt to the Government of the Russian Federation, or in debt to any entity owned 
or controlled by the Russian Federation; (3) block any high ranking Russian Federation 
individuals from transactions dealing with property or interests in the United States; and (4) 
deny visa to those same high ranking individuals.105 The third section of Title II adds the DETER 
Act to the list of sanctions that have congressional oversight in section 216 of the Countering 
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.106 
 Title III states that after the passage of the DETER Act, in 90 day intervals, the President 
is required to report to the appropriate congressional committees on any attempts by a 
governmental or organization body other than Russia to interfere in an election in the U.S. The 
second section of Title III also requires that the President or his designee will report to Congress 
on potential strategies, sanctions, actions, and plans, the President intends to pursue to deter 
interference from the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
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Table 1. Sanctions in the DETER Act 
Sanctions against Russian Federation Financial institutions 
 1 Block assets of Russian institutions such as Russian banks and Russian energy companies 
 2 Prohibit the any new investment made in the United States in any energy company owned by the Russian Federation. 
 3 Block assets of Russian defense and intelligence sectors 
Sanctions against Russian Individuals 
 1  
Prohibit all transactions involving the identified individual, if they concern 
property or interests within the united states, property or interests that will 
come into the united States, or involve property or interests currently 
possessed by a United States individual. 
 2 
Prohibit all transactions inside the United States made by individuals in debt 
to the Government of the Russian Federation, or in debt to any entity owned 
or controlled by the Russian Federation. 
 2 Deny visa to, and exclude from the United States. 
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the Islamic Republic of Iran, and any other foreign entity determined by the President to likely 
engage in election interference.107  
Authorization 
The DETER Act itself will be authorized by the legislative process. DETER also utilizes 
authorization from other sources. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 
2017, section 201 of Public Law 115-44, defines who falls under the designation of a foreign 
political figure or oligarch in the Russian Federation. This is used to create the official list of the 
high-ranking Russian Federation, individuals within the reports submitted by the President and 
the DNI. The DETER Act also utilizes the authorization of congressional oversight from the 
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. The Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides the authorizing definitions for the financial assets to be 
blocked from interacting with American interests.108 The authority to deny entry to the United 
States, one of the sanctions listed in the DETER act, comes from the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.109 
The specific authorization for the Secretary of the Treasury to impose the specific 
financial sanctions is found in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The 
IEEPA grants authority to the President to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to exercise the 
sanction powers to block and prohibit all transactions and dealings between American interests 
and Russian Federation interests, if those American interests are within the United States, are 
going to come in to the United States, or are controlled by a United States individual.110 
Implementation 
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Implementation for this policy would begin with the President and the Director of 
National Intelligence. Their offices would be responsible for the administrative burden of 
creating and presenting the reports that would dictate whether the economic sanctions should 
be imposed. The main policy tool for achieving the goal of deterring foreign election 
interference would be the economic sanctions, which would be implemented by the Secretary 
of the Treasury at the direction of the President and overseen by Congress, if required by the 
DNI report.111 
V. Policy Analysis 
Although misinformation is a “wicked” problem and may only be mitigated, it may be 
possible to deter misinformation spread by foreign governments, which would otherwise 
attempt to influence U.S. elections. This section analyzes the proposed DETER act, asking how 
effective it is at tackling the goal of deterring election interference. First, by looking at similar 
sanctions in the United States, the proposed policy can be analyzed for any redundancy. A 
process analysis will then look at the reporting and sanctions individually to analyze the 
effectiveness of the policy. Third, a cost-benefit analysis will determine whether the policy is 
financially viable or if it creates too much of a financial burden. Lastly, the benefits will be 
weighed against the drawbacks of policy and summarized. 
Comparative Analysis 
First, the DETER Act should be compared to similar sanctions to determine whether this 
new policy is redundant or not. The most similar policy to the DETER Act is Executive Order 
13848 (EO), which President Donald Trump signed in the fall of 2018. While there are minor 
differences between the two policies, such as the length of time the DNI has after an election to 
submit their report, there are two major differences that add credence to the notion that the 




policies are not duplicative. First, Daniel Mack of the Emery International Law Review notes that 
one of the main difference between the Executive Order and the DETER Act is that under the 
EO, the president can implement the policy at his own discretion, whereas the DETER Act 
requires mandatory sanctions, overseen by congress.112 The second significant distinction is that 
the EO does not specifically address election misinformation, spread by a foreign entity. While 
the Executive Order does mention that the, “covert distribution of propaganda and 
disinformation, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat”113 to the security of elections, 
it only provides the authorization for sanctions against a foreign entity that interferes in an 
election solely through election infrastructure.114 Ed Stein of the Lawfare Institute noted this as 
well, stating that solely targeting election infrastructure, and defining it solely as the IT 
components of infrastructure, is a narrow view of election interference.115 This has not stopped 
the Treasury Department, however, from issuing sanctions under the EO against a Ukrainian 
Parliament member for editing and disseminating falsified audiotapes of Presidential candidate 
Joe Biden.116 While the two policies have differing goals, and target different activities, how 
agencies may implement the EOs in practice, may make the DETER Act redundant.  
Process Analysis 
 This section will look at the DETER Act’s processes to measure the effectiveness of the 
proposed policy. First, the administrative aspects of the DNI and the Executive Office will be 
reviewed, followed by an in depth look at the sanctions. The DNI and the Executive Office 
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routinely produce reports on the various topics, and past reports can provide an insight in to 
their effectiveness. First, for the reporting to be effective, it needs to be timely. There is some 
evidence that this time sensitivity can be met by reporting. During the 2020 Presidential 
Election, the DNI released a statement in July and again in August to educate the American 
people on foreign entities and their current attempts to influence the election.117 Another 
example can be found in the previous presidential election. The DNI released a report 59 days 
after the 2016 election, detailing Russian election interference that took place. These give 
evidence to the notion that the reporting function of the DETER Act is indeed effective.  
 There is a body of research that shows that under certain circumstances, sanctions are 
effective. Research has shown that sanctions may be more effective if they are more severe, 118 
if they are directed at individuals rather than a whole population,119 and if they are targeted at a 
specific behavior.120 Comparing the DETER Act sanctions to these criterion gives an indication 
that the policy is effective. Ed Stein of the LawFare Institute called the sanctions in the DETER 
Act, “extraordinarily severe,” which suggests that they may be severe enough to be 
successful.121 Furthermore, the DETER Act specifically targets individuals, though it does target 
financial institutions, and it explicitly is targeted toward the stated election interference 
activities. This suggests that the DETER Act would be successful.  
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 Finally, due to the economic nature of the sanctions within the proposed DETER Act, a 
cost-benefit analysis can provide a benchmark to which to measure the effectiveness of the 
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policy against. First, the costs of the policy should be estimated. There are two sets of costs 
involved in the DETER Act, the cost of administering the policy, and the cost of implementing the 
economic sanctions. The cost of administering the policy, the costs involved in the reporting 
process, can be thought of as a fixed cost, in the sense that they follow the election cycles. If the 
DETER Act achieves is goal of deterring foreign election interference, then it follows that the 
costs associated with implementing the sanctions will not manifest. The sanctions must be 
balanced so that they are severe enough to deter the undesired activity, but not so severe that 
the economic fallout would harm the global economy as a whole. Because of these two different 
costs, associated with two different phases of the policy, two separate cost-benefit analyses 
must be used.  
 The first cost-benefit analysis focuses on the cost of administering the policy. The cost-
benefit equation can be summarized as:  
Total Program Benefits – Total Program Costs = Net Present Value 
To start, the total program costs will be calculated. The main program administering costs stem 
from the reporting function. Having the Director of National Intelligence, and the Executive 
Office, review, compile, and report on election security may not severely add any new 
budgetary demands on both entities, but there may still be costs involved. The budget for the 
total United States Intelligence Community in 2020 was $85.8 billion, roughly two thirds of 
which was appropriated for the National Intelligence Program (NIP).122 The bulk of the DNI 
assessment and reporting activities would fall under this budget. However, not all of this budget 
could reasonably be thought of as the cost of administering the program. Only a certain 
percentage of the budget can reasonably be used for the cost side of the equation. The 
Congressional Budget Office has not put forth a cost estimate for this, however, the Office of 
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Management and Budget (OMB) reported on the budgetary impact for Executive Order 13848, 
which has the same reporting functions as the DETER Act. The OMB determined that 
implementing the administrative aspects of the policy, the assessment and reporting activities, 
would “have a de minimis impact on mandatory and discretionary obligations and outlays, as 
well as on revenues to the Federal Government.”123 What this means in this context is that the 
administrative activities would add so little to the administrative costs of the agencies involved, 
that the amount is negligible. Because of this estimation, the cost side of the equation can be 
thought of as approximately zero.  
 Next, the program benefits will need to be calculated. Clearly, if the DETER Act is 
successful, elections, and the country, would benefit from being free of foreign influence. To 
quantify this in monetary terms, however, may be more difficult. Luckily, there are some 
concrete examples that can help narrow down the benefits.  
In the case of the Syrian Electronic Army hacking the Twitter account of the Associated 
Press, sending out false messages that the President had been injured created a drop in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average that equaled $136 billion.124 This cost of $136 billion could be thought 
of as the benefit amount if the policy had deterred the initial spread of false news. Also, the 
University of Baltimore explored the financial costs of fake news in their report, “The Economic 
Cost of Bad Actors on the Internet.” They reported that the largest stock market loss from 
misinformation was over $300 billion, whereas on an annual basis, fake news creates an annual 
loss of approximately $39 billion in stock market activity.125 They estimated that the direct costs 
associated with the spread and consumption of misinformation during the 2020 Presidential 
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Election was $200 million.126 However, the report does note that by adding indirect costs, such 
as the cost associated with correcting false assertions, not to mention the societal costs 
associated with a decrease in trust of institutions, that the cost is most likely far higher.127 On 
the lower end of the costs associated with having to rectify false election information, though 
not an insignificant amount, Robert Mueller’s report on the Russian interference of the 2016 
Presidential Election cost $32 million.128 These costs of misinformation can be thought of as the 
benefits amount, had the misinformation been averted.  
Using a conservative estimate of $200 for the benefit of the DETER Act the equation can 
be updated with the costs and benefits as such: 
 ($200 million) – (≈0) = $200 million 
It can be seen that the benefits far outweigh the costs for implementing the DETER ACT, if the 
DETER Act is successful.  
The second cost-benefit analysis will look at costs when sanctions are indeed imposed 
on the Russian Federation, in response to election interference. The program benefits will 
continue to be $200 million, with a caveat that this is a conservative estimate of only the direct 
benefits. The program costs will increase from de minimis to an amount that includes the 
economic cost of sanctions against the Russian Federation. Due to the global nature of the 
economy, the economic sanctions against Russia will undoubtedly affect U.S. markets to some 
degree. Russia was the 20th largest supplier of imports to the U.S. in 2019, totaling $22.3 billion, 
while the U.S. is only the 40th largest supplier of exports to Russia, totaling $5.8 billion.129 In 
total, Russia is the 26th largest trade partner with the U.S., and the amount of trading equates to 
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an estimated 66,000 jobs.130 Targeting individuals will not have a drastic effect on the trade 
between the U.S. and Russia, but sanctions targeting institutions may. The largest industry 
affected may be energy, as it is the largest group of goods imported to the U.S. from Russia, 
listed as mineral fuels, which totaled $13 billion.131 That the majority of lobbyists registered to 
lobby for or against the DETER Act are energy companies gives some credence to the notion that 
the energy sector may be impacted. The harms to the U.S. economy that this decrease in trade 
due to sanctions will impose may be difficult to calculate. If the mineral fuels disrupt other 
industries that rely on them, then a larger affect may be seen. However, if those mineral fuels 
can be acquired elsewhere, albeit at a higher original cost, then the affect is lessened. The cost 
of sanctions could be thought of as the difference between the $13 billion in mineral fuels that 
would have been purchased from the Russian Federation entity, and the amount that would be 
used to purchase those mineral fuels elsewhere. Similarly, the cost of the sanctions could be 
thought of as the decrease in exports to Russia that may arise from sanctions affecting those 
sectors. Iikka Korhonen of the Institute for Economies in Transition determined that western 
countries that imposed sanctions on certain Russian sectors indeed saw a decrease in their 
exports, and noted that it was this was the true cost of the sanctions.132  
Using again a conservative estimate of $200 million for the benefits of the DETER Act 
the equation can be updated with the costs associated with a loss of export revenue. The 
equation can be updated as such:  
 ($200 million) – (≈$5.8 billion) = $5.6 billion 
It can be seen that the cost far outweigh the benefits for implementing the DETER ACT, if the 
DETER Act sanctions must be put in to place.  
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From the comparative analysis, the process analysis, and the cost-benefit analysis, we 
can see the pros and cons of the DETER Act. Table 2 summaries the findings from the three 
analyses. It can be seen from Table 2 that the pros outweigh the negative aspects of the policy.  
 
VI. Political Analysis 
In this section, the policy will be approached through a political lens. This is to 
determine the political feasibility of having the DETER Act enacted. First, a favorability analysis 
will look at whether or not the American people are in favor of solving the problem of foreign 
misinformation at this time. Following that, a legislative evaluation will look at the steps needed 
in congress to enact DETER. This will include looking at which committees are involved, whether 
or not the policy is likely to pass the Senate and the House, and whether it is likely that the 
President will sign the DETER Act.  
First, there seems to be ample evidence that the American people believe that 
misinformation is a serious problem that needs to be remedied. A Pew Research Center survey 
in early 2019 found that 82 percent of Americans found “made-up news and information” a “big 
Table 2. Summary of DETER Act Policy Analysis Results 
Pros 
 1  The Reporting aspect of the DETER Act is effective 
 2 The Sanctions seem to be severe enough and targeted enough to be successful 
 3 If the DETER Act is effective in deterring election interference, the benefits far outweigh the costs 
  Cons  
 2 In practice, Executive Order 13848 may already be used to target the activity the DETER Act targets 
 2 Economic sanctions may adversely affect the Energy sector, causing costs to rise.  
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problem,” and that roughly half of respondents found false information to be a larger problem 
than crime, climate change, racism, immigration reform, or terrorism.133 Furthermore, the 
survey finds that close to 79 percent of adults in the United States believe that government 
action is needed to stem the tide of false information.134 This is an increase of about 34 percent 
from 2016, in which only 45 percent thought that the government should do something about 
false news.135 Additionally, a Gallup poll found that 73 percent of Americans believe that 
misinformation disseminated online is a serious problem.136 From these polls, it seems evident 
that a significant percentage of the public would support legislature to combat misinformation. 
However, this public perception is solely on misinformation in general, not specifically that 
which is spread by foreign actors. The Pew Research Survey results from 2019 also shed some 
light specifically on this problem. The survey found that 35 percent of Americans believe that a 
lot of the misinformation being spread is created by “foreign-based individuals or groups” while 
48 percent of respondents said some was spread by foreign entities.137 More respondents 
stated that they believe activist groups and political leaders create a lot of misinformation.138 
Despite this it can still be surmised that a bill attempting to mitigate misinformation, in any 
form, would be received positively by a majority of Americans.  
Because of the polarized nature of American politics, it is more difficult to pass 
legislative policy that is favored by one party and not the other. The survey results displayed in 
Figure 3 do seem to show that foreign created misinformation has a more similar salience to 
both Republican and Democratic respondents, whereas the other originators of false 
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information seem to have a wider difference in their importance to Republicans and 
Democrats.139  
                            Figure 3 
       
        Source: Data sourced from Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 45, 
2019; created using GGPLOT2.  
Only “The Public” had a more similar importance to both parties, but that importance was 
relatively smaller than all other creators of misinformation. 
In the Senate, the committee that has been assigned with reviewing the first and second 
iteration of the DETER Act has been the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. This 
committee is chaired by Republican Senator Mike Crapo of Idaho and contains 13 Republicans 
and 12 Democrats. The bill was last introduced in the Senate in 2019 by Democratic Senator 
Chris Van Hollen of Maryland and cosponsored by six Republicans and six Democrats, including 
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Senator’s Marco Rubio [R-FL] and Amy Klobuchar [D-MN].140 Because of this, the bill has been 
touted as bipartisan.141 There is some evidence that Senator Crapo is not inclined to have the bill 
move out of committee. In an article published by The Hill, Crapo is quoted stating that, “The 
mechanisms in this bill have been designed more to attack the Trump administration and 
Republicans than to attack the Russians.”142 However, fellow committee members Ben Sasse [R-
NE], Martha McSally [R-AZ], and Mark R. Warner [D-VA], are all sponsors of the legislation.143  
The DETER Act was also introduced in the House in September 2020, as a mirror of the 
Senate bill. It was introduced by Representative Brad Schneider [D-IL] and cosponsored by two 
Republican representatives, Brian Fitzpatrick [R-PA] and John Katko [D-NY], and Democratic 
Representative Brad Sherman [D-CA].144  
There are eight entities that have officially registered to lobby for or against the DETER 
Act. Three of these lobbyists are energy companies that include BP, Exxon Mobil, and Chevron 
Corp. The American Petroleum Institute has also registered as a lobbyist. General Electric is also 
a lobbyist. Issue One, an organization created to advocate for political reform, also registered as 
a lobbyist on the DETER Act. One organization directly mentioned by the DETER Act, the Russian 
Federation Bank Sberbank, has also registered as a lobbyist, likely lobbying against the DETER 
Act.145  
There is some indication to suggest that the bill would pass both the House and Senate. 
In fiscal year 2020, some aspects of the DETER Act were included in House of Representatives 
National Defense Authorization Act, and in the Senate, a resolution urging the National Defense 
Authorization Act to include the full DETER Act passed unanimously, though those provisions 
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were dropped during the conference.146 Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer stated that if 
the bill were brought to a vote in the Senate, he believed it would pass unanimously.147 While 
President Donald Trump has signaled with his Executive Order 13848, and has repeatedly railed 
against “fake news,”148 he may not be receptive a law that limits his maneuverability in regards 
to foreign policy with Russia.149 However, a new incoming administration may be more receptive 
to signing such bills in to law. Taking the political analysis as a whole, Table 3 summarizes the 
political benefits and costs associated with the proposed DETER Act.  
 
VII. Recommendation 
 With the world being more interconnected, and with the advent of AI technologies 
enabling further individualized targeting, misinformation spread by foreign actors in the attempt 
to influence the outcome of U.S. elections will increase. The electoral process is the bedrock of 
democratic participation in the United States, and as such, interference in that process must be 
deterred. While the DETER Act may be interpreted as similar in practice to the Executive Order 
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Table 3. Summary of DETER Act Political Analysis Results 
Pros 
 1  Public opinion is in support of tackling this problem 
 2 There is some bipartisan agreement on the policy 
 3 Likely to pass the House and Senate 
  Cons  
 2 Chair of committee overseeing the policy is not in favor of the policy.  
 2 Economic lobbyists may not be in favor of the policy due to economic interests.   
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13848 that President Donald Trump issued in 2018, other administrations may use the strict 
definitions of influence, namely on election “infrastructure,” to use their own discretion to 
decide not to issue sanctions specifically for misinformation interference. Because of this, the 
recommendation of this memorandum is to attempt to bring the DETER Act to a vote in the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in the 117th Congress.  
 The DETER Act is likely to pass both the House and Senate, and the incoming 
administration is likely to sign the legislature.150 The Act will also be favored positively be a 
majority of Americans, and will bring a much needed air of bipartisanship to the 117th Congress. 
From the cost-benefit analysis it can be seen that if successful in achieving its goal, the benefits 
of the DETER Act far outweigh its costs. If sanctions are imposed, and the U.S. economy is 
affected adversely, the costs may outweigh the monetary benefits. However, the non-monetary 
benefits of having trust in the electrical process may offset that cost drastically. 
That the sanctions are harmful enough that they may impose costs on the U.S. economy 
speaks to their severity, though clearly the brunt of that severity is levied on the Russian 
Federation. For a deterrent to work the threat of retaliation should be credible. Thomas 
Schelling, an early proponent of deterrence as a policy, wrote that, “one must threaten that he 
will act, not that he may act.”151 The notion of automatic, severe sanctions, directly targeted to 
specified individuals and institutions should be effective enough to target foreign 
misinformation.  
Even though misinformation, specifically originating from foreign entities, is a “wicked 
problem,” the proposed DETER Act will help lessen this false information. While it may not be 
possible to solve misinformation in its entirety, it goes a long way to mitigate the problem. 
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Because of this the policy would be effective. Ed Stein notes that for the Russian Federation to 
undertake another comprehensive influence campaign against a U.S. election would “require 
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